The eects of an agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol, which implicitly imposes a ceiling on the stock of pollution, have recently been studied in Hotelling models. We add pollution and a ceiling to the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) to study the eects of the ceiling on capital accumulation and research investments. The ceiling increases the scarcity of the exhaustible resource in the short run, which boosts backstop utilization.
Introduction
Climate change has been one of the major issues both in public and academic discussion in recent decades. A wide range of nations agreed in the Kyoto Protocol to limit climate change. The best known political goal is the 2
• C climate target which allows for long-run global temperature increase of 2 • C above pre-industrial level. This target had been a subject to political and scientic discussion and was nally endorsed by the United Nation Conference of the Parties in Cancun in 2010. 1 The supporters of the climate target agree that the consequences of climate change remain manageable as long as the global temperature increase does not exceed 2 • C. According to Graÿl et al. (2003) the 2 • C climate target translates into a maximum CO 2 concentration of 400 -450ppm. Hansen et al. (2008) advocate a maximum CO 2 concentration of 350ppm to preserve the planet as it was during the development of civilization. Regardless of one follows the 2 • C climate target or Hansen et al. (2008) , both implicitly impose a ceiling on the stock of CO 2 . Since other agreements follow a similar approach, e.g. the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, it seems likely that a successor of the Kyoto Protocol will include an implicit or explicit ceiling on the stock of CO 2 . One of the main sources of CO 2 emissions are fossil fuels. Therefore, a ceiling on the CO 2 concentration might have a signicant impact on the energy generation of the economy. Chakravorty et al. (2006a) was motivated by the described problem to analyze the effects of a ceiling on the stock of CO 2 , or more generally pollution. Further works in this literature strand are Chakravorty et al. (2006b) , Chakravorty et al. (2008) , Chakravorty et al. (2012) and Laorgue et al. (2008) . This literature analyzes how a ceiling on the stock of pollution changes the optimal resource utilization path. A Hotelling model with polluting exhaustible resources and a renewable non-polluting resource serves as the basic framework, which is augmented in several ways. Abatement activities are considered by Chakravorty et al. (2006a) and Laorgue et al. (2008) . Chakravorty et al. (2008) focus on the consequences of two dierently polluting exhaustible resources. Chakravorty et al. (2012) extend the model of Chakravorty et al. (2006a) by technological progress, which is caused by a learning-by-doing eect and decreases the costs of the backstop. It is shown that the optimal resource utilization path depends on the cost structure established by the standard assumption of the Hotelling model and the assumption related to the specic augmentation. Owning to its Hotelling based structure, the literature fails to consider capital or research activities, which are both determinants of economic growth, structural change and changes of the energy mix as shown by Tsur and Zemel (2005) . R&D in particular seems to be a non-negligible factor, as it is the driving force behind a steadily positive growth rate in many endogenous growth models, e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) . 2 Therefore, this paper strives to analyze the eects of a ceiling on the stock of pollution in an economy incorporating a polluting exhaustible resource and a backstop as well as capital and research driven technological progress. For this purpose we augment the suitable endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) with both pollution and a ceiling on the stock of pollution. Utilization of the two resources occasions costs. In contrast to the usual assumption of endogenous growth models, technological progress does not augment the productivity of resources or capital, but reduces the costs associated with the use of the backstop. With regard to energy generation, the chosen modeling constitutes the more realistic approach. For clarication we refer to Stiglitz (1974) . By modifying Solow's neoclassical growth model, Stiglitz shows that sustainable economic development is compatible with exhaustible resources or fossil fuels, respectively, if technology, which enhances the resource's productivity, increases suciently fast. 3 However, the result rests upon the assumption that a vast amount of goods can be produced by a vanishingly low amount of fossil fuel, and suciently advanced technology. Without renewable energies, which are not considered by Stiglitz (1974) , fossil fuels are the only energy source. However, thermodynamics require some minimum stake of energy for every production process. 4 In this light, the assumption of Tsur and Zemel (2005) seems more realistic. Other features from the Hotelling models, such as abatement or dierently polluting exhaustible resources, are left for further research, in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible.
In the present paper we show that the social optimum consists of three time periods (or phases) which appear in the Hotelling models in a similar manner. As in Chakravorty et al. (2006a) , the only possible sequence containing all three time periods starts with a non-binding ceiling which becomes binding later on. After a phase with a binding ceiling, the ceiling becomes non-binding again and will stay it forever. Thus, neither capital nor research can explain other sequences. However, research reduces the costs of the backstop.
As long as the backstop is used, the unit costs of the backstop determine the energy price as well as the marginal costs of the last used unit of exhaustible resources. Technological progress implies therefore a reduction of both. Together with changing energy demand, caused by the variable capital stock, and in contrast to Chakravorty et al. (2006a) , the model can explain a decreasing scarcity rent of the exhaustible resource endogenously. By analyzing the development during the three phases and taking the only possible sequence into account, we can describe the optimal path of the economy. The development of 3 See Solow (1956) . 4 Compare Meyer et al. (1998) , page 171.
the economy depends on its state described by capital stock and technology. Due to the ceiling the scarcity of the exhaustible resource is increased above its "natural" level, i.e.
the level without the ceiling. This "additional" scarcity increases the number of capitaltechnology combinations with the optimality of research instead of capital accumulation in the rst two phases. Since the economy must be described by one of this capitaltechnology combinations, which change from the optimality of capital accumulation to the one of research, to be aected, we call the eect of the ceiling an increase of R&D incentives. During the phase with a binding ceiling the additional scarcity and therefore also the excess incentives are eliminated. In the long run, i.e. in the last phase, the ceiling will be never reached. Thus, there is no additional scarcity and the economy develops as the unconstrained one of Tsur and Zemel (2005) . Hence, the constrained economy will basically follow the same long run development path as the unconstrained economy. To sum up, we show how the ceiling aects capital accumulation and research activities and
give an endogenous explanation for decreasing scarcity rents of the exhaustible resource.
To complete the discussion, we decentralize the social optimum in a competitive market.
The analysis is based upon a neoclassical framework with price-taking composite product manufacturers and individuals, as well as Cournot competition on the resource market between two resource owning companies. Neither the individuals nor the companies take their inuence on the emission stock into account. Therefore, the exhaustible resource has to be taxed in the short run. In the long run, the tax is not needed due to the high scarcity of the resource. To adjust for market power eects resulting from the Cournot competition both resources must be subsidized at all times.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the model. The social optimum is described in section 3. The market economy and government interventions necessary for the social optimum are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes the discussion.
Model
We augment the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) with a pollution stock and a ceiling on the stock of pollution. For that purpose we describe the model structure of Tsur and Zemel (2005) briey. 5 A single composite good Y is produced by using capital K and energy x according to the well behaved production function
To avoid a collapse of production, the assumptions lim 
Technology A increases in research investment I in compliance witḣ
R&D investments are limited by the net income, i.e. I ∈ [0, Y n ]. Hereafter the upper bound is represented byĪ. As long as fossil fuel is used, the resource stock S R , with the initial value S R 0 , decreases according toṠ
At every point in time the representative household exhibits a strictly concave utility function U (C) which increases in consumption with lim C→0 U (C) = ∞. To avoid the optimality 5 We refer to Tsur and Zemel (2005) for details. Deviations from Tsur and Zemel (2005) are indicated explicitly. For the sake of simplicity time index t is suppressed. It is only added, if needed for understanding.
6 Tsur and Zemel (2005) 
of C = 0, we also assume U (0) = −∞. 7 Therefore, the utility is given by
Following Chakravorty et al. (2006a) and the other Hotelling models mentioned above, utilization of fossil fuel causes pollution E. 8 By appropriate unit choice we can set R = E.
Thus, R and E are used synonymously. The stock of pollution is S E , while its initial value is denoted by S E 0 . With γ being the natural regeneration rate, S E develops according to 9
The ceilingS E is imposed exogenously, for example by an political decision. 10 Then S E − S E ≥ 0 must hold at every point in time. Due to the ceiling, it is possible to divide the complete planning period into three time phases depending on the ceiling's status.
Phase 1 is characterized by a non-binding ceiling. In phase 2 the ceiling is binding for a limited time period. In phase 3 the ceiling is non-binding and stays that forever.
Social Optimum
In the following section we derive the (constrained) social optimum. Thus, we assume that a constrained social planner maximizes the utility over the complete planning period given the initial state (K 0 , A 0 , S R 0 , S E 0 ) and subject to (1), (2), (3), (5),S E − S E ≥ 0,
The present value of utility is given by 7 Due to lim K→0 F K = ∞ and (15) a decreasing capital stock is accompanied by increasing consumption. Therefore, K = 0 and C = 0 could be reached in nite time, if the assumption U (0) = −∞ is not made. 8 While it is reasonable to assume that pollution has negative eects on utility and/or production, we follow Chakravorty et al. (2006a) , Chakravorty et al. (2006b) , Chakravorty et al. (2008) , Chakravorty et al. (2012) , Laorgue et al. (2008) and neglect these eects to concentrate on the eect of a ceiling on pollution and to keep the model as simple as possible. This implies that there are no marginal costs of pollution.
9 This form is widely used in the literature. E.g. by Guruswamy Babu et al. (1997) and Tsur and Zemel (2009) . 10 The political decision can be both an election outcome or the result of an international agreement. Chakravorty et al. (2006a) , Chakravorty et al. (2012) and Chakravorty et al. (2008) refer to the latter. According to Chakravorty et al. (2008) and Laorgue et al. (2008) the ceiling may also reect a damage function that impose zero (or negligible) damages below the ceiling but prohibitive high damages above it. The ceiling can also be imposed by some regulatory authority, as stated by Chakravorty et al. (2006a) and Chakravorty et al. (2008) . Since the ongoing international climate negotiations refer mainly to the 2 • C climate target, Eichner and Pethig (2013) use also a ceiling in their analysis of unilateral climate policy.
11 Following Chakravorty et al. (2008) and Chakravorty et al. (2012) we refer to the social planer has a constrained one, since utility is maximized subject to the exogenously given ceiling. Thus, we are not going to determine whether the ceiling is optimal or not but to analyze the optimal solution given the ceiling.
−ρt dt, with ρ as the time preference rate. Thus, with λ, κ, τ and θ representing the current-value costate variables of K, A, S R and S E , and µ representing the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ceiling, the current-value Lagrangian is 12
Analogous to Tsur and Zemel (2005) , an interior optimum is given by the following necessary conditions: 13
The total energy supply, as well as the energy mix can be determined graphically by means of (8) and (9). In Fig. 1 the marginal productivity of energy is given by 
both energy sources are used and total energy utilization is given by
q determine the share of fossil fuel. The amount of used 12 Notice that there are two mathematically approaches to solve a dynamic optimization problem with state space constraints. We apply here the approach which Chiang (1992) , p. 298 et seqq. calls the "alternative approach" and Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) , p. 164 et seqq. the "indirekte Methode". 13 It can be shown that the sucient conditions hold as long as
< 0 both sides of the inequality are positive. As long as the backstop is used, which is assumed, the inequality holds if M b is suciently small.
14 A similar gure with θ = µ = 0 can be found in Tsur and Zemel (2005) , p. 488. Thus, the gure of Tsur and Zemel (2005) is a special case of Fig. 1 . backstop equals the dierence x − E. Following Tsur and Zemel (2005) we assume that both resources are used. 15
In the following, the index * denotes optimal values, while unmarked variables denote 
Depending on the relation of κ to λ, R&D investments are minimal, singular or maximal.
The costate variables grow according to
Combining (11) with (7) establishes the well-known Ramsey -rulê
The rule states that the growth rate of consumptionĈ is positive as long as the marginal product of capital is higher than the time preference rate. Consumption reacts the stronger to the dierence the smaller the positive elasticity of marginal utility (η) is.
The complementary slackness condition is given by
To complete the equation system the transversality conditions
are needed.
Before analyzing the three phases it is useful to determine the possible sequences of phases. In Appendix A.1 it is shown that the only sequence containing all three phases starts with a non-binding ceiling, i.e. in phase 1. At the end of phase 1, at t = t 1 , the ceiling becomes binding, so that the economy switches into phase 2, and stays binding for a limited time period. At the moment t = t 2 the ceiling becomes non-binding again and the economy switches into phase 3. Thus, the ceiling stays non-binding for all following points in time. This sequence of phases was already found by Chakravorty et al. (2006a) . Thus, the introduction of capital and R&D cannot explain other sequences. Furthermore, the switch from one phase to the next is smooth, i.e. the development paths of consumption, backstop and fossil fuel utilization, technology and capital do not exhibit discontinuities.
The sign of θ during phase 1 can be easily explained by its interpretation as the shadow price of the emission stock. An external marginal increase of the stock narrows the problem of the social planner. Therefore, the increase has a negative value, which implies θ < 0 in phase 1. Phase 3 was characterized by an emission stock that will never reach the ceiling.
Since we abstain from direct eects of pollution on utility or production, the emission stock has no relevance for the constrained social planer. 16 θ = 0 follows directly. With a binding ceiling θ cannot be interpreted as a shadow price. 17 However, in Appendix A.1
we show that θ is continuous at t = t 2 . Together with θ = 0 during phase 3, we get that θ equals zero at the end of phase 2. (12) implies that θ decreases constantly, if θ(t) < 0 holds for point in time during phase 2. Since this contradicts θ(t 2 ) = 0, a binding ceiling
Proposition 1 The development of consumption, capital, technology, backstop and fossil fuel utilization is continuous. The only sequence containing all three phases begins with phase 1, switches over to phase 2 and ends with phase 3.
The phases
In this section we turn to the analysis of the three phases. In phase 3 the ceiling is never reached so that µ = θ = 0, which implies the identity of phase 3 with an unconstrained economy described by Tsur and Zemel (2005) . 18 Since Tsur and Zemel (2005) are also one basis for our model, the analysis starts with phase 3 before we turn to phase 1 and 2.
3.1.1. Phase 3 -the long run
As phase 3 is identical with the economy of Tsur and Zemel (2005) , the following remarks are limited to the extent that is necessary for understanding. For proofs, as well as for more detailed explanations, we refer to Tsur and Zemel (2005) . As mentioned above, phase 3 is characterized by θ = µ = 0 so that the relative scarcity index reads
. Due to (11) and (13) the growth rate of m q 3 is given bym Thus, 16 Notice that this does not mean that pollution is irrelevant for the economy or that the ceiling is set to low. Environmental concerns, like the damage function mentioned in footnote 10, are reected by the ceiling. Since the ceiling is exogenously given, it goes beyond the scope of this paper if it is reecting the environmental concerns correctly.
17 See Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) , p. 175-176. According to Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) , p. 171, θ equals the sum of the shadow price of the emission stock and µ during phase 2.
18 µ = 0 follows directly from (16). (8) and (9) give
(18) determines b(K, A), E(A) and x(K, A). The optimal R&D investments are given by (10). Thus, the optimization problem reduces to the task of identifying optimal consumption and capital accumulation for every point in time. Tsur and Zemel (2005) show that this can be done by comparing the position of the economy in the three-dimensional technology-capital-time space with two characteristic manifolds (planes). 19 The timedimension reects the development of the scarcity index and therefore of the energy mix.
As can be seen in Fig. 1 the higher the scarcity index the higher is the backstop share ceteris paribus.
The rst plane describe all points in the A, K, t space which allow the steady statė C =K =Ȧ = 0. Therefore, we refer to it as the steady state plane (SSP). It is given by the steady state, (7) and (11), which imply
The plane is increasing in A but is independent from time, as F K (K, x(K, A)) depends on total energy but not on the energy mix. Consumption increases (decreases) below (above) the SSP.
The second plane describes all points where singular R&D is optimal and is therefore called the singular plane (SiP). Only above the SiP maximal R&D is optimal, while below it no research can be conducted. The plane is given by the no-arbitrage condition with respect to net production between investments into the capital stock and into technology, i.e. by
. The SiP increases in technology but decreases in time (scarcity) as long as S R > 0. If the resource stock is exhausted it is independent from time. The interpretation of the SiP decline in time is straightforward. As the increasing scarcity implies a higher share of backstop, the eect of a technology increase on net production strengthen while the eect of capital accumulation remains unchanged. Thus, R&D (capital accumulation) becomes feasible for more (less) A, K combinations. This process could be interpreted as an increase of R&D advantageousness, and will play a major role in the following discussion of the other two phases and economic development over the whole time. Both planes SiP and SSP are illustrated in Fig. 2 , with T R denoting the point in time S R becomes exhausted. Tsur and Zemel (2005) show that the economy approaches the SiP or the SSP with either Thus, from (16) we get µ = 0. Since the ceiling becomes binding later on, changes of the emission stock are valued by the social planner by θ < 0, as shown before. By using θ 1 to indicate the phase the shadow price belongs to, we get from (8) the variant of phase 1
for (18):
The relative scarcity index m q 1 is now given by τ +|θ 1 | λ and its growth rate readŝ
Ceteris paribus, the scarcity index is both higher and increasing faster then in an economy without the ceiling, i.e. with the same A, K combination and the same costate variables but without θ 1 . In the following, such an economy is called unbounded. As the scarcity index τ λ of an unbounded economy reects the pure relative scarcity of fossil fuel, we refer to it as the natural scarcity. During phase 1 the additional scarcity
by the ceiling, adds to the natural one. Fig. 1 implies that the additional scarcity boosts backstop utilization and reduces fossil fuel use while leaving total energy input x unchanged. As stated in section 3.1.1 the higher backstop utilization implies a greater eect of an increasing technology on net production. Therefore, R&D instead of capital accumulation becomes feasible for more A, K combinations implying an increase in R&D advantageousness, i.e. a SiP that is both lying below and decreasing faster in time then the SiP of an unbounded economy. As shown in section 3.1.1, the SSP is not aected by scarcity. Therefore, the additional scarcity has no eect on the SSP.
The development program is not aected by the ceiling. However, the economy cannot be in phase 1 for ever. If it were, the emission stock converges to the ceiling for t → ∞.
This implies lim t→∞ E(t) = γS E and therefore the exhaustion of S R in nite time. But with S R = 0 the emission stock decreases to zero, contradicting a forever binding ceiling. Thus, the economy cannot reach the steady state at the intersection of SSP and SiP for S R = 0 during phase 1. Only the two exceptions form section 3.1.1 remain for reaching a steady state.
Proposition 2 During phase 1 the prospectively binding ceiling adds an additional scarcity to the natural one and is therefore increasing the R&D advantageousness. Compared with an unbounded economy the R&D advantageouness is both higher and increasing faster.
Phase 2
During phase 2 the ceiling is binding. (16) implies µ 2 > 0. As stated above θ > 0 during phase 2. To indicate the phase we use the notation θ 2 and µ 2 . (8) is rewritten to form the variant of phase 2 for (18):
The relative scarcity index is given by m
. According to Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) , p. 171, θ 2 equals the sum of the shadow price of the emission stock and µ 2 . As the shadow price of the emission stock is negative, µ 2 (t) − θ 2 (t) ≥ 0. 20 Thus, the relative scarcity index m q 2 is higher than in an unbounded economy. Thus, in phase 2 there is 20 A marginal exogenous decrease of the emission stock has a positive value for the constrained social planer. still an additional scarcity, which implies that the R&D advantageousness is higher then in an unbounded economy. However, the growth ratem q 2 is ambiguous, because no exact information is given aboutμ 2 in (16):
To obtain more information about the development of m q 2 and therefore also about the development of the R&D advantageousness, we use the binding ceiling. It implies that the fossil fuel utilization is xed at E =Ē = γS E . Fig. 1 As in the other two phases, neither the SSP nor the development program are aected by the ceiling. The former is independent from the scarcity index. The latter one is not aected, because the economy cannot stay in phase 2 forever. 21 Therefore, the steady state at the intersection of SSP and SiP for S R = 0 is ruled out and only the two exceptions from 3.1.1 are left.
Proposition 3 Due to the constant resource inputĒ, the ceiling establishes a link between R&D activities and the R&D advantageousness. R&D advantageousness remains unchanged if R&D investments are minimal and decreases in time if R&D investments are positive. Compared with an unbounded economy R&D advantageousness is higher. 21 Otherwise, E(t) = γS E implies the exhaustion of S R in nite time and therefore the violation of S E =S E . Thus, the economy has to switch from phase 2 to phase 3 at some later point in time.
Optimal development
To analyze the development over the whole planning period [0, ∞] it is necessary to join the analysis of the three phases. For this purpose we use the relative scarcity indices m q 1 , m q 2 and m q 3 . Furthermore, the smooth transition from one phase to the next must be noticed. Therefore, the SiP and SSP of the three phases can be attached to each other.
Since the SSP is independent of time t, it is identical to the one described in section 3.1.1.
The SiP decreases in time during phase 1 and during phase 3 as long as S R > 0. In phase 2 it is either constant or increasing in time. Since an increasing SiP requires singular or maximal R&D investments, there are two more, mixed possibilities. The rst one appears if the development path approaches the SiP from below, i.e. the economy is accumulating capital to realize the research option. In this case, the SiP remains unchanged until the path reaches it and increases afterwards. In the second case, maximal R&D investments are reduced to minimal investments before the SiP is reached, i.e. the economy converges to a steady state. Then the SiP increases at the beginning of the phase and remains unchanged at the end. Figure 3 illustrates the two border cases of a completely unchanged and a steadily increasing SiP in the A, K, t space. The development of the SiP is closely and m q 3 , i.e. the additional scarcity. In the second case, R&D investments are positive. Therefore, utilization of the backstop increases, implying a decreasing share of R in the energy mix. Since fossil fuel is less important, its relative scarcity declines. Hence, singular or maximal R&D reduces the additional scarcity actively, establishing a second driving force in addition to the passive reduction of additional scarcity. As backstop utilization declines ceteris paribus with a lower scarcity index, the R&D advantageousness decreases.
To switch over to phase 3, the additional scarcity must be eliminated completely. This follows directly from θ = µ = 0 in phase 3 and the smooth transition from one phase to the next. 22 The phase itself is equivalent to an economy without a ceiling.
Thus, the ceiling causes an increase in the scarcity of fossil fuel and thereby a reduction in 22 See Appendix A.1 for a detailed proof. its usage during phase 1 and 2. Since the ceiling would be violated without the additional scarcity, the result is quite intuitive. The additional scarcity increases as the pollution concentration approaches the ceiling, indicating a smaller growth rate of R. At the ceiling, the additional scarcity decreases due to the declining resource stock S R and possibly increasing utilization of the backstop. The scarcity induced reduction of R causes an increase in backstop utilization and therefore of R&D advantageousness. Consequently, the advantageousness of capital accumulation declines.
The short-run eects of the ceiling of the development path of an economy are ambiguous. The ceiling does not only introduce the additional scarcity but can also alter the initial shadow prices of capital λ 0 and fossil fuel τ 0 and therefore of the natural scarcity. 23
However, if the initial shadow prices are suciently similar, the following analysis holds.
We distinguish between poor economies with a low capital endowment and rich ones with a high capital endowment. As stated in section 3.1.1 a poor economy which is located below the SiP generally approaches the SiP with minimal R&D by capital accumulation.
Thus, its optimal investment choice is only aected by the additional scarcity, if it reaches the SiP during phase 1 or 2. In this case, the economy starts R&D at a lower capital stock than an economy without the ceiling, i.e. earlier in its development process. 24 In other words, an economy is less developed or poorer when it starts R&D. Since the R&D investments are not available for capital accumulation, the economy investments into the capital stock are correspondingly lower. If an poor economy ignores the research option at all (ii. exception from section 3.1.1) or is only accumulating capital during phase 1 and 2, its optimal investment choice is not aected. However, due the increased use of backstop the energy costs are higher with the ceiling in the rst two phases. Therefore, less net production is available for consumption and capital or R&D investments, which may stretch the time period until the development process reaches the critical level allowing R&D.
A rich economy which is located above the SiP can be aected by the ceiling in two ways. Generally, the economy approaches the SiP with maximal R&D. Since the ceiling increases the backstop utilization, at least in early periods less net production can be invested into research. Furthermore, the optimal investment decision is aected, if 23 A short analysis with respect to an altered λ is given below. 24 Notice that "early" is here not revering to time but to the capital stock level. the economy would reach the SiP without the ceiling at a point in time that belongs either to phase 1 or 2. As the additional scarcity increases the R&D advantageousness by strengthen the decline of the SiP in time, the economy switches to singular research at a lower capital stock level. This may extend the time period of maximal R&D. If this time period is suciently extended, it compensates for the lower net production such that the economy switches to singular R&D at a higher development stage, i.e. with a higher technology level. As above, more R&D investments imply that less investments are made into the capital stock, or in the case of maximal R&D more capital is consumed. If the economy conducts maximal R&D during phase 1 and 2 regardless of whether the ceiling exists or not, i.e. if the economy is suciently rich, the ceiling induced additional scarcity lowers only the net production. In the case of minimal R&D above the SiP (i. exception from section 3.1.1) the higher per unit energy costs may shorten the time period until the economy reaches a steady state on the SSP.
In the long run an economy with a ceiling and one without a ceiling will exhibit the same SiP (and SSP) after the resource stock S R is exhausted, because all energy is then generated by the backstop. Therefore, the R&D advantageousness is the same in both cases. This implies for the two standard cases from section 3.1.1 that the position of the long run development path is not aected by the ceiling. However, the position of a constrained economy on the path may be dierent from that of an economy without the ceiling at some specic point in time. In case of the ii. exception, an poor economy does not conduct R&D but converges to the SSP. Positive R&D would be only possible if the relative scarcity reaches a level higher than that of an exhausted resource stock. However, in this case fossil fuel is no longer used. Thus, if the additional scarcity had increased the scarcity to this level, it would have been impossible to reach or stay at the ceiling, which contradicts the fact that the economy must be in phase 1 or 2 to justify the additional scarcity. However, the long run development may be aected by the ceiling in case of the i. exception. This rich economy follows a MRAP with minimal R&D investments above the SiP. If the MRAP with minimal R&D is only a part of the development path, and was preceded by a part with maximal R&D, higher (lower) net production in early periods may cause a higher (lower) technology level and capital stock in the steady state.
The analysis of Chakravorty et al. (2006a) is based essentially on the scarcity of fossil fuel, which translates directly into the price of the resource in a Hotelling model. To ex-plain a decreasing scarcity fossil fuel at the ceiling Chakravorty et al. (2006a) needed the assumption of decreasing global energy demand. In the current model a rising (declining) capital stock increases (decreases) energy demand. 25 However, the backstop absorbs all changes in total energy demand caused by a variation of the capital stock at the ceiling. 26 A decreasing scarcity is caused here by R&D, which increases the utilization of the backstop. Consequently, the share of fossil fuel in the energy mix declines. 27 The opposite eect of increasing scarcity at the ceiling cannot be explained, since there is no possibility of increasing the share of fossil fuel in the energy mix. For this purpose, either depreciation with respect to technology or a second technology that is related to fossil fuel must be taken into account.
The development of the relative scarcity index together with Fig. 1 Fig. 1 . 26 If b = 0, a decreasing (increasing) capital stock and therefore a lower (higher) energy demand implies a lower (higher) scarcity to ensure E =Ē.
27 Chakravorty et al. (2012) get a similar result due to a learning -by -doing eect which decreases the costs of the backstop. constrained economy. The other path, E u , illustrates the path of an economy that is identical with the constrained one at t = 0 but without the ceiling. Since the complete resource stock must be used, both the area under E b and under E u equals S R . Thus, the area marked with D 1 represents the amount of fossil fuel that is not used at early points of time in the constrained economy. Therefore, this amount must be used later 
Market Economy
After having analyzed the (constrained) social optimum we turn to a market economy in this section. We will show how fossil fuel tax needs to develop to ensure the ceiling. The economy consists of a great number of identical individuals and composite good producers as well as two resource owning companies. 29 The individuals own all companies in the Y -and resource sector, as well as the capital stock. They maximize their intertemporal utility with respect to their budget constraint. The companies in the composite good sector rent capital and buy resources to generate energy. Since they do not face an intertemporal problem, they maximize their prot at every point in time. The two resource owners sell the resources and, in the case of the backstop owning company, conduct research. Therefore, they maximize their intertemporal prot with respect to either the resource stock or the technology. We assume a Cournot competition on the resource market and perfect competition on all other markets. The government has the possibility of taxing fossil fuel, with φ denoting the corresponding quantity tax rate. Additionally, both resources can be subsidized with s R or s b , respectively. To balance the budget, the government can levy a lump-sum tax or grant a lump-sum transfer, both denoted with T 0.
Given the described market structure, a representative individual faces the intertemporal optimization problem
The interest rate and the price of the composite good are represented by r and p Y respectively. π, π b and π R denote the prots of the composite good producers and the two resource owners. From the necessary conditions
we get 30
λ H represents the costate variable associated with the capital stock and η the (positive) elasticity of U (C). The Ramsey rule (24) states that consumption will increase as long as the real interest rate is greater than the time preference rate. According to λ H = U (C), the marginal utility equals λ H , i.e. the price the individual would pay for an increase of 29 The assumption of two resource owners and a Cournot competition is a simplication of the well known patent assumption in the endogenous growth theory. See for example Romer (1990) . A more complex model with several research rms would not alter the results. 30 The current value Lagrangian as well as the necessary conditions are presented in Appendix A.2 his capital stock. For an equilibrium on the composite good market λ H = p Y is necessary.
Otherwise, the individual would buy more (less) Y for investing in the capital stock and
As mentioned above, the composite good producers do not have to solve an intertemporal optimization problem. Instead they maximize their prot at every point in time.
Omitting a rm index and with p b and p R denoting the resource prices, the representative producer's prot is given by
state that the marginal product of any input has to equal its real price. Since the composite good producers have no market power, these conditions hold, if the capital and resource market are cleared. By substituting
into (24) we get the socially optimal Ramsey rule (15).
The resource owners know the prot maximization problem of the composite good producers and therefore the price-demand functions for both resources
The prots of the resource owners for each point in time are then given by
The fossil fuel owner maximizes its discounted ow of prots with respect to S R ≥ 0 anḋ S R = −R ≤ 0. Appendix A.3 shows the current value Lagrangian as well as the derivation of the rst order conditions. As long as fossil fuel is used, the rst order condition with respect to R can be written as
τ M denotes the costate variable of the resource stock, which grows with the constant rate ρ and is therefore determined by its initial value τ 0M . Since the capital stock, the tax, the subsidy and the price p Y are exogenous to both resource owner and τ M determined by τ 0M , equation (27) denes implicitly the optimal resource supply R * subject to the amount of supplied backstop. Thus, the reaction function is given by R * = R * (b).
Using the same approach for the backstop owner we get for b > 0: 32
31 For the resource owners the capital stock is a known but exogenous factor. 32 The Lagrangian and the derivation of the rst order conditions can be found in Appendix A.3.
(28) denes implicitly the optimal backstop supply subject to R and the technology level A, which increases with the resource owner's R&D investments. We get b * = b * (R, A).
The optimal R&D investments are given by the maximization of the Lagrangian with respect to I, with κ M denoting the costate variable of technology: 27) and (28) respectively, the Nash -Cournot equilibrium is implicitly given: 
For the further analysis we assume that the constrained social planner values capital, the resource stock S R , and knowledge A in the same way as the subjects of the economy, which implies
In this case the equations related to R&D are identical. The ceiling has no eect on the economy in phase 3, which suggests φ = 0.
Therefore, the optimal subsidies are determined by comparing the marginal products of R and b of this phase. We get
Using (33) we get for the optimal tax
Phase One
Phase Two
Phase Three
Market Equilibrium
Ramsey -ruleĈ = Comparison of the market equilibrium and the socially optimal solution
Proposition 5 The market equilibrium replicates the social optimum, if λ = λ H , τ = τ M and κ = κ M holds, the usage of both resources is subsidized according to (32) and (33), and fossil fuel is taxed according to (34) .
Due to (12) the tax increases during phase 1 at the rate ρ + γ, reecting the increasing emission stock, and therefore the tightening ceiling. In other words, as the emission stock increases, the amount of possible new emissions decreases, implying a higher tax. During phase 2, this amount is xed atĒ = γS E . However, this does not imply a constant tax but, (in the long run) a decreasing one, because the natural scarcity of fossil fuel increases. Thus, the tax at the second junction point at t = t 2 equals φ(t 2 ) = 0. As the growth rate of µ 2 is variable, φ 2 (t) may increase as well as decrease. Nevertheless, Fig. 6 shows that the tax can only increase, if the composite good price p Y grows fast enough.
In this case the growth rate of the natural scarcity 
we can show that consumption must indeed decline if the tax increases. The tax increases if, and only if,
The left hand side equalsm q 2 , which can only decrease or stay unchanged. Therefore, 0 > F K − ρ φ 2 ψ and because of φ 2 < ψ it follows F K − ρ < 0. According to the Ramsey rule (24) F K − ρ < 0 implies decreasing consumption, which is only possible if the economy lies above the SSP. Thus, during phase 2 the tax cannot increase in a suciently poor economy.
Proposition 6 The optimal tax increases during phase 1 due to the increasing emission stock. Since the natural scarcity increases monotonically, the tax decreases to zero during phase 2. If ination is suciently high, and consumption declines, the tax increases in the short run of phase 2.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eects on R&D and the capital stock of a ceiling on the pollution stock. For this purpose we augment the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) with a polluting resource and a ceiling on the stock of pollution as known from the literature following Chakravorty et al. (2006a) . We show that the ceiling mainly aects the short run development of the economy by imposing an additional scarcity on fossil fuel. Since the costs of the backstop can be reduced by R&D, the additional scarcity increases the R&D advantageousness. If the ceiling does not aect the natural scarcity, the short run development is aected in two ways. On the one hand, higher energy costs decrease at least in early periods the amount of available production for capital or R&D investments. On the other hand, the optimal investment decision is aected, if the economy is neither too poor nor too rich. A poor economy will conduct R&D at an early development stage. In a rich economy the period of maximal R&D may be extended which can lead to a higher technology level. Consequently, both economies invest fewer into the capital stock. As long as the economy conducts some singular R&D, the long run development is hardly aected by the ceiling. In other words, the long run development path remains unchanged, whereas the position of the economy on the path to one specic point in time may be altered. If R&D is omitted, the ceiling has also no eect. The ceiling may alter the steady state of the economy if and only if maximal R&D is canceled in favor of minimal R&D.
As in Chakravorty et al. (2006a) , Chakravorty et al. (2006b) , Chakravorty et al. (2008) , Chakravorty et al. (2012) and Laorgue et al. (2008) , we are able to distinguish three time phases. Analogous to Chakravorty et al. (2006a) , the only sequence containing all three phases starts with a non-binding ceiling that will bind later on to become and stay nonbinding afterwards. In contrast to the Hotelling models we can explain changes of total energy demand endogenously by the variable capital stock. Similar to Chakravorty et al.
(2012) a declining resource scarcity at the ceiling is caused by an increasing technology level. However, the necessary R&D is an explicit decision and R&D can be abandoned, while Chakravorty et al. (2012) assumes a cost reducing learning-by-doing eect. In both cases, the importance of fossil fuel for the energy mix vanishes as the utilization of the backstop is intensied.
The optimal fossil fuel extraction path is aected by the ceiling, since it exhibits a plateau during phase 2. While intuition suggests a reduction of fossil fuel utilization at the starting time to delay the moment the ceiling becomes binding, the results also permit some kind of a green paradox. In this case, the natural scarcity of fossil fuel is aected by the ceiling and both fossil fuel utilization and non-consumed income are higher. This implies greater investments in the capital stock and/or research to adjust to the ceiling.
We show that the social optimum is implemented by a market economy, if the government subsidizes both resources to counter market power eects resulting from Cournot competition on the resource market. Additionally, fossil fuel has to be taxed during phases 1 and 2 to comply with the ceiling. During phase 1, the tax increases monotonically, reecting the rising emission stock. During phase 2, the emission stock remains unchanged, while the natural scarcity of fossil fuel increases, resulting in the tax being abolished at the end of phase 2. If ination is suciently high, the tax can increase in phase 2 temporary. In this case, consumption decreases which requires a suciently rich economy. It is noteworthy that the model does not support subsidies for the backstop that are granted for pollution control reasons.
The presented model is rather a basic model, as it ignores several augmentations used in the literature following Chakravorty et al. (2006a) . These are abatement investments, dierently polluting exhaustible resources and limited carbon sinks. Especially the former seems interesting as abatement may substitute for R&D. We have also ignored that the amount of already used fossil fuel may inuence the extraction costs. Concerning the backstop one could assume a non-linear cost structure. Another promising research eld is the endogenization of the ceiling by means of a specic damage function or, in a model with multiple countries, by a multilateral bargaining process. By introducing a second technology which associated to fossil fuel it would be possible to analyze the inuence of the ceiling on the direction of technical change.
A. Appendix
A.1. Junction points
The jump conditions for the costate variables at a junction point j which is characterized by a ceiling that becomes binding (entry point) is 33
with Γ = τ, θ, λ; Γ V being the associated state variable S R , S E , K as well as + and − denoting the values just after and just before the junction point, respectively. It shows that τ and λ are continuous while θ may jump. At a junction point where the ceiling becomes non-binding (exit point) all costate variables are continuous. 34 Due to (7), the continuity of λ implies a continuous consumption path. Since the indirect approach is used for (6), the jump condition can be written as 35
Due to (16), µ = 0 during phase 1 and 3. In phase 3 the ceiling is non-binding and will never be reached. Since pollution does not aect production or utility directly, it is then irrelevant for the social planner. Thus, θ must be zero. Therefore, the relative scarcity index in phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3 is M (E) are not aected by a junction point, a sudden drop in E is only possible if the relative scarcity index increases. Therefore, the following conditions must hold at junction points between phase 1 and 2 as well as between phase 2 and 3.
• At a junction point t 1 from phase 1 to phase 2: See Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p.170. 35 Cf. Chiang (1992) , p. 300 et seq. and Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) , p. 171-172.
• At a junction point t 2 from phase 2 to phase 3:
• At a junction point t 3 from phase 2 to phase 1:
Substituting (A.2) shows that all three conditions must hold equally. This implies the continuity of E, since the state variables capital K and technology A have to be continuous, too. The total energy input depends only on K and A, so that its continuity, as well that of b = x(K, A) − E(K, A), follows directly. Thus, both production factors are continuous, which implies the continuity of Y . The one of consumption C results from the continuity of λ and (7). Therefore, the economy switches smoothly from one phase to the next.
If we denote the variables by the corresponding phase, we can rewrite the conditions at the junction points as θ 2 (t 1 ) = θ 1 (t 1 ) + µ 2 (t 1 ), θ 2 (t 2 ) = µ 2 (t 2 ) and θ 2 (t 3 ) = θ 1 (t 3 ) + µ 2 (t 3 ), respectively. Obviously, the rst and third conditions are identical. Thus, should there be more than one junction point between phase 1 and 2, the conditions must hold for two or more dierent points in time. However, by solving (12) and (16) The right hand side of (A.3) and (A.4) is called T f (t). It is continuous in time and dT f dt < 0 for ξ(t) < 1. As long as the growth rate of µ is lower than the time preference rate, T f decreases strictly. In this case, both (A.3) and (A.4) hold only for one point in time, which implies just one junction point between both phase 1 and 2 and between phase 2 and 3.
Furthermore, θ 01 must be negative. Otherwise, the junction point between phase 2 and 3 would be located before the junction point between phase 1 and 2 on the time line, which is impossible due to the denition of phase 3. The only possible sequence containing all phases is 1, 2, 3. In the case of ξ(t) = 1 the right hand side of (A.3) and (A.4) reduces to zero. It follows θ 02 = θ 01 = 0. This implies that the emission path will be only tangent to the ceiling. Therefore, this case is negligible.
The condition θ 2 (t 1 ) = θ 1 (t 1 ) + µ 2 (t 1 ) reveals that θ jumps at the entry point, if µ(t 1 ) > 0.
Since all costate variables are continuous at the exit point and θ = 0 in phase 3, the corresponding condition θ 2 (t 2 ) = µ 2 (t 2 ) implies θ − (t 2 ) = µ − (t 2 ) = 0.
A.2. Individual
The current value Hamiltonian of the representative individual is:
The rst order conditions and the transversality condition are given by:
lim t→∞ e −ρt λ H (t)[K(t) − K * (t)] ≥ 0 (A.8)
A.3. Resource Owners
The current value Hamiltonian of the rm owning the exhaustible resource is:
The rst order condition as well as the transversality condition are given by: T R denotes the point in time the resource stock S R becomes exhausted.
The current value Hamiltonian of the rm owning the backstop is:
The rst order condition as well as the transversality condition are given by: The maximization of the Hamiltonian with respect to I gives:
The index * marks the optimal value of the variable in question.
